Mutual Funds vs the Subaccount - Financial Web

Everything You Always Wanted To Know About Swaps* (*But Were Afraid To Ask)

Hello, dummies
It's your old pal, Fuzzy.
As I'm sure you've all noticed, a lot of the stuff that gets posted here is - to put it delicately - fucking ridiculous. More backwards-ass shit gets posted to wallstreetbets than you'd see on a Westboro Baptist community message board. I mean, I had a look at the daily thread yesterday and..... yeesh. I know, I know. We all make like the divine Laura Dern circa 1992 on the daily and stick our hands deep into this steaming heap of shit to find the nuggets of valuable and/or hilarious information within (thanks for reading, BTW). I agree. I love it just the way it is too. That's what makes WSB great.
What I'm getting at is that a lot of the stuff that gets posted here - notwithstanding it being funny or interesting - is just... wrong. Like, fucking your cousin wrong. And to be clear, I mean the fucking your *first* cousin kinda wrong, before my Southerners in the back get all het up (simmer down, Billy Ray - I know Mabel's twice removed on your grand-sister's side). Truly, I try to let it slide. I do my bit to try and put you on the right path. Most of the time, I sleep easy no matter how badly I've seen someone explain what a bank liquidity crisis is. But out of all of those tens of thousands of misguided, autistic attempts at understanding the world of high finance, one thing gets so consistently - so *emphatically* - fucked up and misunderstood by you retards that last night I felt obligated at the end of a long work day to pull together this edition of Finance with Fuzzy just for you. It's so serious I'm not even going to make a u/pokimane gag. Have you guessed what it is yet? Here's a clue. It's in the title of the post.
That's right, friends. Today in the neighborhood we're going to talk all about hedging in financial markets - spots, swaps, collars, forwards, CDS, synthetic CDOs, all that fun shit. Don't worry; I'm going to explain what all the scary words mean and how they impact your OTM RH positions along the way.
We're going to break it down like this. (1) "What's a hedge, Fuzzy?" (2) Common Hedging Strategies and (3) All About ISDAs and Credit Default Swaps.
Before we begin. For the nerds and JV traders in the back (and anyone else who needs to hear this up front) - I am simplifying these descriptions for the purposes of this post. I am also obviously not going to try and cover every exotic form of hedge under the sun or give a detailed summation of what caused the financial crisis. If you are interested in something specific ask a question, but don't try and impress me with your Investopedia skills or technical points I didn't cover; I will just be forced to flex my years of IRL experience on you in the comments and you'll look like a big dummy.
TL;DR? Fuck you. There is no TL;DR. You've come this far already. What's a few more paragraphs? Put down the Cheetos and try to concentrate for the next 5-7 minutes. You'll learn something, and I promise I'll be gentle.
Ready? Let's get started.
1. The Tao of Risk: Hedging as a Way of Life
The simplest way to characterize what a hedge 'is' is to imagine every action having a binary outcome. One is bad, one is good. Red lines, green lines; uppie, downie. With me so far? Good. A 'hedge' is simply the employment of a strategy to mitigate the effect of your action having the wrong binary outcome. You wanted X, but you got Z! Frowny face. A hedge strategy introduces a third outcome. If you hedged against the possibility of Z happening, then you can wind up with Y instead. Not as good as X, but not as bad as Z. The technical definition I like to give my idiot juniors is as follows:
Utilization of a defensive strategy to mitigate risk, at a fraction of the cost to capital of the risk itself.
Congratulations. You just finished Hedging 101. "But Fuzzy, that's easy! I just sold a naked call against my 95% OTM put! I'm adequately hedged!". Spoiler alert: you're not (although good work on executing a collar, which I describe below). What I'm talking about here is what would be referred to as a 'perfect hedge'; a binary outcome where downside is totally mitigated by a risk management strategy. That's not how it works IRL. Pay attention; this is the tricky part.
You can't take a single position and conclude that you're adequately hedged because risks are fluid, not static. So you need to constantly adjust your position in order to maximize the value of the hedge and insure your position. You also need to consider exposure to more than one category of risk. There are micro (specific exposure) risks, and macro (trend exposure) risks, and both need to factor into the hedge calculus.
That's why, in the real world, the value of hedging depends entirely on the design of the hedging strategy itself. Here, when we say "value" of the hedge, we're not talking about cash money - we're talking about the intrinsic value of the hedge relative to the the risk profile of your underlying exposure. To achieve this, people hedge dynamically. In wallstreetbets terms, this means that as the value of your position changes, you need to change your hedges too. The idea is to efficiently and continuously distribute and rebalance risk across different states and periods, taking value from states in which the marginal cost of the hedge is low and putting it back into states where marginal cost of the hedge is high, until the shadow value of your underlying exposure is equalized across your positions. The punchline, I guess, is that one static position is a hedge in the same way that the finger paintings you make for your wife's boyfriend are art - it's technically correct, but you're only playing yourself by believing it.
Anyway. Obviously doing this as a small potatoes trader is hard but it's worth taking into account. Enough basic shit. So how does this work in markets?
2. A Hedging Taxonomy
The best place to start here is a practical question. What does a business need to hedge against? Think about the specific risk that an individual business faces. These are legion, so I'm just going to list a few of the key ones that apply to most corporates. (1) You have commodity risk for the shit you buy or the shit you use. (2) You have currency risk for the money you borrow. (3) You have rate risk on the debt you carry. (4) You have offtake risk for the shit you sell. Complicated, right? To help address the many and varied ways that shit can go wrong in a sophisticated market, smart operators like yours truly have devised a whole bundle of different instruments which can help you manage the risk. I might write about some of the more complicated ones in a later post if people are interested (CDO/CLOs, strip/stack hedges and bond swaps with option toggles come to mind) but let's stick to the basics for now.
(i) Swaps
A swap is one of the most common forms of hedge instrument, and they're used by pretty much everyone that can afford them. The language is complicated but the concept isn't, so pay attention and you'll be fine. This is the most important part of this section so it'll be the longest one.
Swaps are derivative contracts with two counterparties (before you ask, you can't trade 'em on an exchange - they're OTC instruments only). They're used to exchange one cash flow for another cash flow of equal expected value; doing this allows you to take speculative positions on certain financial prices or to alter the cash flows of existing assets or liabilities within a business. "Wait, Fuzz; slow down! What do you mean sets of cash flows?". Fear not, little autist. Ol' Fuzz has you covered.
The cash flows I'm talking about are referred to in swap-land as 'legs'. One leg is fixed - a set payment that's the same every time it gets paid - and the other is variable - it fluctuates (typically indexed off the price of the underlying risk that you are speculating on / protecting against). You set it up at the start so that they're notionally equal and the two legs net off; so at open, the swap is a zero NPV instrument. Here's where the fun starts. If the price that you based the variable leg of the swap on changes, the value of the swap will shift; the party on the wrong side of the move ponies up via the variable payment. It's a zero sum game.
I'll give you an example using the most vanilla swap around; an interest rate trade. Here's how it works. You borrow money from a bank, and they charge you a rate of interest. You lock the rate up front, because you're smart like that. But then - quelle surprise! - the rate gets better after you borrow. Now you're bagholding to the tune of, I don't know, 5 bps. Doesn't sound like much but on a billion dollar loan that's a lot of money (a classic example of the kind of 'small, deep hole' that's terrible for profits). Now, if you had a swap contract on the rate before you entered the trade, you're set; if the rate goes down, you get a payment under the swap. If it goes up, whatever payment you're making to the bank is netted off by the fact that you're borrowing at a sub-market rate. Win-win! Or, at least, Lose Less / Lose Less. That's the name of the game in hedging.
There are many different kinds of swaps, some of which are pretty exotic; but they're all different variations on the same theme. If your business has exposure to something which fluctuates in price, you trade swaps to hedge against the fluctuation. The valuation of swaps is also super interesting but I guarantee you that 99% of you won't understand it so I'm not going to try and explain it here although I encourage you to google it if you're interested.
Because they're OTC, none of them are filed publicly. Someeeeeetimes you see an ISDA (dsicussed below) but the confirms themselves (the individual swaps) are not filed. You can usually read about the hedging strategy in a 10-K, though. For what it's worth, most modern credit agreements ban speculative hedging. Top tip: This is occasionally something worth checking in credit agreements when you invest in businesses that are debt issuers - being able to do this increases the risk profile significantly and is particularly important in times of economic volatility (ctrl+f "non-speculative" in the credit agreement to be sure).
(ii) Forwards
A forward is a contract made today for the future delivery of an asset at a pre-agreed price. That's it. "But Fuzzy! That sounds just like a futures contract!". I know. Confusing, right? Just like a futures trade, forwards are generally used in commodity or forex land to protect against price fluctuations. The differences between forwards and futures are small but significant. I'm not going to go into super boring detail because I don't think many of you are commodities traders but it is still an important thing to understand even if you're just an RH jockey, so stick with me.
Just like swaps, forwards are OTC contracts - they're not publicly traded. This is distinct from futures, which are traded on exchanges (see The Ballad Of Big Dick Vick for some more color on this). In a forward, no money changes hands until the maturity date of the contract when delivery and receipt are carried out; price and quantity are locked in from day 1. As you now know having read about BDV, futures are marked to market daily, and normally people close them out with synthetic settlement using an inverse position. They're also liquid, and that makes them easier to unwind or close out in case shit goes sideways.
People use forwards when they absolutely have to get rid of the thing they made (or take delivery of the thing they need). If you're a miner, or a farmer, you use this shit to make sure that at the end of the production cycle, you can get rid of the shit you made (and you won't get fucked by someone taking cash settlement over delivery). If you're a buyer, you use them to guarantee that you'll get whatever the shit is that you'll need at a price agreed in advance. Because they're OTC, you can also exactly tailor them to the requirements of your particular circumstances.
These contracts are incredibly byzantine (and there are even crazier synthetic forwards you can see in money markets for the true degenerate fund managers). In my experience, only Texan oilfield magnates, commodities traders, and the weirdo forex crowd fuck with them. I (i) do not own a 10 gallon hat or a novelty size belt buckle (ii) do not wake up in the middle of the night freaking out about the price of pork fat and (iii) love greenbacks too much to care about other countries' monopoly money, so I don't fuck with them.
(iii) Collars
No, not the kind your wife is encouraging you to wear try out to 'spice things up' in the bedroom during quarantine. Collars are actually the hedging strategy most applicable to WSB. Collars deal with options! Hooray!
To execute a basic collar (also called a wrapper by tea-drinking Brits and people from the Antipodes), you buy an out of the money put while simultaneously writing a covered call on the same equity. The put protects your position against price drops and writing the call produces income that offsets the put premium. Doing this limits your tendies (you can only profit up to the strike price of the call) but also writes down your risk. If you screen large volume trades with a VOL/OI of more than 3 or 4x (and they're not bullshit biotech stocks), you can sometimes see these being constructed in real time as hedge funds protect themselves on their shorts.
(3) All About ISDAs, CDS and Synthetic CDOs
You may have heard about the mythical ISDA. Much like an indenture (discussed in my post on $F), it's a magic legal machine that lets you build swaps via trade confirms with a willing counterparty. They are very complicated legal documents and you need to be a true expert to fuck with them. Fortunately, I am, so I do. They're made of two parts; a Master (which is a form agreement that's always the same) and a Schedule (which amends the Master to include your specific terms). They are also the engine behind just about every major credit crunch of the last 10+ years.
First - a brief explainer. An ISDA is a not in and of itself a hedge - it's an umbrella contract that governs the terms of your swaps, which you use to construct your hedge position. You can trade commodities, forex, rates, whatever, all under the same ISDA.
Let me explain. Remember when we talked about swaps? Right. So. You can trade swaps on just about anything. In the late 90s and early 2000s, people had the smart idea of using other people's debt and or credit ratings as the variable leg of swap documentation. These are called credit default swaps. I was actually starting out at a bank during this time and, I gotta tell you, the only thing I can compare people's enthusiasm for this shit to was that moment in your early teens when you discover jerking off. Except, unlike your bathroom bound shame sessions to Mom's Sears catalogue, every single person you know felt that way too; and they're all doing it at once. It was a fiscal circlejerk of epic proportions, and the financial crisis was the inevitable bukkake finish. WSB autism is absolutely no comparison for the enthusiasm people had during this time for lighting each other's money on fire.
Here's how it works. You pick a company. Any company. Maybe even your own! And then you write a swap. In the swap, you define "Credit Event" with respect to that company's debt as the variable leg . And you write in... whatever you want. A ratings downgrade, default under the docs, failure to meet a leverage ratio or FCCR for a certain testing period... whatever. Now, this started out as a hedge position, just like we discussed above. The purest of intentions, of course. But then people realized - if bad shit happens, you make money. And banks... don't like calling in loans or forcing bankruptcies. Can you smell what the moral hazard is cooking?
Enter synthetic CDOs. CDOs are basically pools of asset backed securities that invest in debt (loans or bonds). They've been around for a minute but they got famous in the 2000s because a shitload of them containing subprime mortgage debt went belly up in 2008. This got a lot of publicity because a lot of sad looking rednecks got foreclosed on and were interviewed on CNBC. "OH!", the people cried. "Look at those big bad bankers buying up subprime loans! They caused this!". Wrong answer, America. The debt wasn't the problem. What a lot of people don't realize is that the real meat of the problem was not in regular way CDOs investing in bundles of shit mortgage debts in synthetic CDOs investing in CDS predicated on that debt. They're synthetic because they don't have a stake in the actual underlying debt; just the instruments riding on the coattails. The reason these are so popular (and remain so) is that smart structured attorneys and bankers like your faithful correspondent realized that an even more profitable and efficient way of building high yield products with limited downside was investing in instruments that profit from failure of debt and in instruments that rely on that debt and then hedging that exposure with other CDS instruments in paired trades, and on and on up the chain. The problem with doing this was that everyone wound up exposed to everybody else's books as a result, and when one went tits up, everybody did. Hence, recession, Basel III, etc. Thanks, Obama.
Heavy investment in CDS can also have a warping effect on the price of debt (something else that happened during the pre-financial crisis years and is starting to happen again now). This happens in three different ways. (1) Investors who previously were long on the debt hedge their position by selling CDS protection on the underlying, putting downward pressure on the debt price. (2) Investors who previously shorted the debt switch to buying CDS protection because the relatively illiquid debt (partic. when its a bond) trades at a discount below par compared to the CDS. The resulting reduction in short selling puts upward pressure on the bond price. (3) The delta in price and actual value of the debt tempts some investors to become NBTs (neg basis traders) who long the debt and purchase CDS protection. If traders can't take leverage, nothing happens to the price of the debt. If basis traders can take leverage (which is nearly always the case because they're holding a hedged position), they can push up or depress the debt price, goosing swap premiums etc. Anyway. Enough technical details.
I could keep going. This is a fascinating topic that is very poorly understood and explained, mainly because the people that caused it all still work on the street and use the same tactics today (it's also terribly taught at business schools because none of the teachers were actually around to see how this played out live). But it relates to the topic of today's lesson, so I thought I'd include it here.
Work depending, I'll be back next week with a covenant breakdown. Most upvoted ticker gets the post.
*EDIT 1\* In a total blowout, $PLAY won. So it's D&B time next week. Post will drop Monday at market open.
submitted by fuzzyblankeet to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

No, the British did not steal $45 trillion from India

This is an updated copy of the version on BadHistory. I plan to update it in accordance with the feedback I got.
I'd like to thank two people who will remain anonymous for helping me greatly with this post (you know who you are)
Three years ago a festschrift for Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri was published by Shubhra Chakrabarti, a history teacher at the University of Delhi and Utsa Patnaik, a Marxist economist who taught at JNU until 2010.
One of the essays in the festschirt by Utsa Patnaik was an attempt to quantify the "drain" undergone by India during British Rule. Her conclusion? Britain robbed India of $45 trillion (or £9.2 trillion) during their 200 or so years of rule. This figure was immensely popular, and got republished in several major news outlets (here, here, here, here (they get the number wrong) and more recently here), got a mention from the Minister of External Affairs & returns 29,100 results on Google. There's also plenty of references to it here on Reddit.
Patnaik is not the first to calculate such a figure. Angus Maddison thought it was £100 million, Simon Digby said £1 billion, Javier Estaban said £40 million see Roy (2019). The huge range of figures should set off some alarm bells.
So how did Patnaik calculate this (shockingly large) figure? Well, even though I don't have access to the festschrift, she conveniently has written an article detailing her methodology here. Let's have a look.
How exactly did the British manage to diddle us and drain our wealth’ ? was the question that Basudev Chatterjee (later editor of a volume in the Towards Freedom project) had posed to me 50 years ago when we were fellow-students abroad.
This is begging the question.
After decades of research I find that using India’s commodity export surplus as the measure and applying an interest rate of 5%, the total drain from 1765 to 1938, compounded up to 2016, comes to £9.2 trillion; since $4.86 exchanged for £1 those days, this sum equals about $45 trillion.
This is completely meaningless. To understand why it's meaningless consider India's annual coconut exports. These are almost certainly a surplus but the surplus in trade is countered by the other country buying the product (indeed, by definition, trade surpluses contribute to the GDP of a nation which hardly plays into intuitive conceptualisations of drain).
Furthermore, Dewey (2019) critiques the 5% interest rate.
She [Patnaik] consistently adopts statistical assumptions (such as compound interest at a rate of 5% per annum over centuries) that exaggerate the magnitude of the drain
Moving on:
The exact mechanism of drain, or transfers from India to Britain was quite simple.
Convenient.
Drain theory possessed the political merit of being easily grasped by a nation of peasants. [...] No other idea could arouse people than the thought that they were being taxed so that others in far off lands might live in comfort. [...] It was, therefore, inevitable that the drain theory became the main staple of nationalist political agitation during the Gandhian era.
- Chandra et al. (1989)
The key factor was Britain’s control over our taxation revenues combined with control over India’s financial gold and forex earnings from its booming commodity export surplus with the world. Simply put, Britain used locally raised rupee tax revenues to pay for its net import of goods, a highly abnormal use of budgetary funds not seen in any sovereign country.
The issue with figures like these is they all make certain methodological assumptions that are impossible to prove. From Roy in Frankema et al. (2019):
the "drain theory" of Indian poverty cannot be tested with evidence, for several reasons. First, it rests on the counterfactual that any money saved on account of factor payments abroad would translate into domestic investment, which can never be proved. Second, it rests on "the primitive notion that all payments to foreigners are "drain"", that is, on the assumption that these payments did not contribute to domestic national income to the equivalent extent (Kumar 1985, 384; see also Chaudhuri 1968). Again, this cannot be tested. [...] Fourth, while British officers serving India did receive salaries that were many times that of the average income in India, a paper using cross-country data shows that colonies with better paid officers were governed better (Jones 2013).
Indeed, drain theory rests on some very weak foundations. This, in of itself, should be enough to dismiss any of the other figures that get thrown out. Nonetheless, I felt it would be a useful exercise to continue exploring Patnaik's take on drain theory.
The East India Company from 1765 onwards allocated every year up to one-third of Indian budgetary revenues net of collection costs, to buy a large volume of goods for direct import into Britain, far in excess of that country’s own needs.
So what's going on here? Well Roy (2019) explains it better:
Colonial India ran an export surplus, which, together with foreign investment, was used to pay for services purchased from Britain. These payments included interest on public debt, salaries, and pensions paid to government offcers who had come from Britain, salaries of managers and engineers, guaranteed profts paid to railway companies, and repatriated business profts. How do we know that any of these payments involved paying too much? The answer is we do not.
So what was really happening is the government was paying its workers for services (as well as guaranteeing profits - to promote investment - something the GoI does today Dalal (2019), and promoting business in India), and those workers were remitting some of that money to Britain. This is hardly a drain (unless, of course, Indian diaspora around the world today are "draining" it). In some cases, the remittances would take the form of goods (as described) see Chaudhuri (1983):
It is obvious that these debit items were financed through the export surplus on merchandise account, and later, when railway construction started on a large scale in India, through capital import. Until 1833 the East India Company followed a cumbersome method in remitting the annual home charges. This was to purchase export commodities in India out of revenue, which were then shipped to London and the proceeds from their sale handed over to the home treasury.
While Roy's earlier point argues better paid officers governed better, it is honestly impossible to say what part of the repatriated export surplus was a drain, and what was not. However calling all of it a drain is definitely misguided.
It's worth noting that Patnaik seems to make no attempt to quantify the benefits of the Raj either, Dewey (2019)'s 2nd criticism:
she [Patnaik] consistently ignores research that would tend to cut the economic impact of the drain down to size, such as the work on the sources of investment during the industrial revolution (which shows that industrialisation was financed by the ploughed-back profits of industrialists) or the costs of empire school (which stresses the high price of imperial defence)

Since tropical goods were highly prized in other cold temperate countries which could never produce them, in effect these free goods represented international purchasing power for Britain which kept a part for its own use and re-exported the balance to other countries in Europe and North America against import of food grains, iron and other goods in which it was deficient.
Re-exports necessarily adds value to goods when the goods are processed and when the goods are transported. The country with the largest navy at the time would presumably be in very good stead to do the latter.
The British historians Phyllis Deane and WA Cole presented an incorrect estimate of Britain’s 18th-19th century trade volume, by leaving out re-exports completely. I found that by 1800 Britain’s total trade was 62% higher than their estimate, on applying the correct definition of trade including re-exports, that is used by the United Nations and by all other international organisations.
While interesting, and certainly expected for such an old book, re-exporting necessarily adds value to goods.
When the Crown took over from the Company, from 1861 a clever system was developed under which all of India’s financial gold and forex earnings from its fast-rising commodity export surplus with the world, was intercepted and appropriated by Britain. As before up to a third of India’s rising budgetary revenues was not spent domestically but was set aside as ‘expenditure abroad’.
So, what does this mean? Britain appropriated all of India's earnings, and then spent a third of it aboard? Not exactly. She is describing home charges see Roy (2019) again:
Some of the expenditures on defense and administration were made in sterling and went out of the country. This payment by the government was known as the Home Charges. For example, interest payment on loans raised to finance construction of railways and irrigation works, pensions paid to retired officers, and purchase of stores, were payments in sterling. [...] almost all money that the government paid abroad corresponded to the purchase of a service from abroad. [...] The balance of payments system that emerged after 1800 was based on standard business principles. India bought something and paid for it. State revenues were used to pay for wages of people hired abroad, pay for interest on loans raised abroad, and repatriation of profits on foreign investments coming into India. These were legitimate market transactions.
Indeed, if paying for what you buy is drain, then several billions of us are drained every day.
The Secretary of State for India in Council, based in London, invited foreign importers to deposit with him the payment (in gold, sterling and their own currencies) for their net imports from India, and these gold and forex payments disappeared into the yawning maw of the SoS’s account in the Bank of England.
It should be noted that India having two heads was beneficial, and encouraged investment per Roy (2019):
The fact that the India Office in London managed a part of the monetary system made India creditworthy, stabilized its currency, and encouraged foreign savers to put money into railways and private enterprise in India. Current research on the history of public debt shows that stable and large colonies found it easier to borrow abroad than independent economies because the investors trusted the guarantee of the colonist powers.

Against India’s net foreign earnings he issued bills, termed Council bills (CBs), to an equivalent rupee value. The rate (between gold-linked sterling and silver rupee) at which the bills were issued, was carefully adjusted to the last farthing, so that foreigners would never find it more profitable to ship financial gold as payment directly to Indians, compared to using the CB route. Foreign importers then sent the CBs by post or by telegraph to the export houses in India, that via the exchange banks were paid out of the budgeted provision of sums under ‘expenditure abroad’, and the exporters in turn paid the producers (peasants and artisans) from whom they sourced the goods.
Sunderland (2013) argues CBs had two main roles (and neither were part of a grand plot to keep gold out of India):
Council bills had two roles. They firstly promoted trade by handing the IO some control of the rate of exchange and allowing the exchange banks to remit funds to India and to hedge currency transaction risks. They also enabled the Indian government to transfer cash to England for the payment of its UK commitments.

The United Nations (1962) historical data for 1900 to 1960, show that for three decades up to 1928 (and very likely earlier too) India posted the second highest merchandise export surplus in the world, with USA in the first position. Not only were Indians deprived of every bit of the enormous international purchasing power they had earned over 175 years, even its rupee equivalent was not issued to them since not even the colonial government was credited with any part of India’s net gold and forex earnings against which it could issue rupees. The sleight-of-hand employed, namely ‘paying’ producers out of their own taxes, made India’s export surplus unrequited and constituted a tax-financed drain to the metropolis, as had been correctly pointed out by those highly insightful classical writers, Dadabhai Naoroji and RCDutt.
It doesn't appear that others appreciate their insight Roy (2019):
K. N. Chaudhuri rightly calls such practice ‘confused’ economics ‘coloured by political feelings’.

Surplus budgets to effect such heavy tax-financed transfers had a severe employment–reducing and income-deflating effect: mass consumption was squeezed in order to release export goods. Per capita annual foodgrains absorption in British India declined from 210 kg. during the period 1904-09, to 157 kg. during 1937-41, and to only 137 kg by 1946.
Dewey (1978) points out reliability issues with Indian agriculutural statistics, however this calorie decline persists to this day. Some of it is attributed to less food being consumed at home Smith (2015), a lower infectious disease burden Duh & Spears (2016) and diversified diets Vankatesh et al. (2016).
If even a part of its enormous foreign earnings had been credited to it and not entirely siphoned off, India could have imported modern technology to build up an industrial structure as Japan was doing.
This is, unfortunately, impossible to prove. Had the British not arrived in India, there is no clear indication that India would've united (this is arguably more plausible than the given counterfactual1). Had the British not arrived in India, there is no clear indication India would not have been nuked in WW2, much like Japan. Had the British not arrived in India, there is no clear indication India would not have been invaded by lizard people, much like Japan. The list continues eternally.
Nevertheless, I will charitably examine the given counterfactual anyway. Did pre-colonial India have industrial potential? The answer is a resounding no.
From Gupta (1980):
This article starts from the premise that while economic categories - the extent of commodity production, wage labour, monetarisation of the economy, etc - should be the basis for any analysis of the production relations of pre-British India, it is the nature of class struggles arising out of particular class alignments that finally gives the decisive twist to social change. Arguing on this premise, and analysing the available evidence, this article concludes that there was little potential for industrial revolution before the British arrived in India because, whatever might have been the character of economic categories of that period, the class relations had not sufficiently matured to develop productive forces and the required class struggle for a 'revolution' to take place.
A view echoed in Raychaudhuri (1983):
Yet all of this did not amount to an economic situation comparable to that of western Europe on the eve of the industrial revolution. Her technology - in agriculture as well as manufacturers - had by and large been stagnant for centuries. [...] The weakness of the Indian economy in the mid-eighteenth century, as compared to pre-industrial Europe was not simply a matter of technology and commercial and industrial organization. No scientific or geographical revolution formed part of the eighteenth-century Indian's historical experience. [...] Spontaneous movement towards industrialisation is unlikely in such a situation.
So now we've established India did not have industrial potential, was India similar to Japan just before the Meiji era? The answer, yet again, unsurprisingly, is no. Japan's economic situation was not comparable to India's, which allowed for Japan to finance its revolution. From Yasuba (1986):
All in all, the Japanese standard of living may not have been much below the English standard of living before industrialization, and both of them may have been considerably higher than the Indian standard of living. We can no longer say that Japan started from a pathetically low economic level and achieved a rapid or even "miraculous" economic growth. Japan's per capita income was almost as high as in Western Europe before industrialization, and it was possible for Japan to produce surplus in the Meiji Period to finance private and public capital formation.
The circumstances that led to Meiji Japan were extremely unique. See Tomlinson (1985):
Most modern comparisons between India and Japan, written by either Indianists or Japanese specialists, stress instead that industrial growth in Meiji Japan was the product of unique features that were not reproducible elsewhere. [...] it is undoubtably true that Japan's progress to industrialization has been unique and unrepeatable
So there you have it. Unsubstantiated statistical assumptions, calling any number you can a drain & assuming a counterfactual for no good reason gets you this $45 trillion number. Hopefully that's enough to bury it in the ground.
1. Several authors have affirmed that Indian identity is a colonial artefact. For example see Rajan 1969:
Perhaps the single greatest and most enduring impact of British rule over India is that it created an Indian nation, in the modern political sense. After centuries of rule by different dynasties overparts of the Indian sub-continent, and after about 100 years of British rule, Indians ceased to be merely Bengalis, Maharashtrians,or Tamils, linguistically and culturally.
or see Bryant 2000:
But then, it would be anachronistic to condemn eighteenth-century Indians, who served the British, as collaborators, when the notion of 'democratic' nationalism or of an Indian 'nation' did not then exist. [...] Indians who fought for them, differed from the Europeans in having a primary attachment to a non-belligerent religion, family and local chief, which was stronger than any identity they might have with a more remote prince or 'nation'.

Bibliography

Chakrabarti, Shubra & Patnaik, Utsa (2018). Agrarian and other histories: Essays for Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri. Colombia University Press
Hickel, Jason (2018). How the British stole $45 trillion from India. The Guardian
Bhuyan, Aroonim & Sharma, Krishan (2019). The Great Loot: How the British stole $45 trillion from India. Indiapost
Monbiot, George (2020). English Landowners have stolen our rights. It is time to reclaim them. The Guardian
Tsjeng, Zing (2020). How Britain Stole $45 trillion from India with trains | Empires of Dirt. Vice
Chaudhury, Dipanjan (2019). British looted $45 trillion from India in today’s value: Jaishankar. The Economic Times
Roy, Tirthankar (2019). How British rule changed India's economy: The Paradox of the Raj. Palgrave Macmillan
Patnaik, Utsa (2018). How the British impoverished India. Hindustan Times
Tuovila, Alicia (2019). Expenditure method. Investopedia
Dewey, Clive (2019). Changing the guard: The dissolution of the nationalist–Marxist orthodoxy in the agrarian and agricultural history of India. The Indian Economic & Social History Review
Chandra, Bipan et al. (1989). India's Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947. Penguin Books
Frankema, Ewout & Booth, Anne (2019). Fiscal Capacity and the Colonial State in Asia and Africa, c. 1850-1960. Cambridge University Press
Dalal, Sucheta (2019). IL&FS Controversy: Centre is Paying Up on Sovereign Guarantees to ADB, KfW for Group's Loan. TheWire
Chaudhuri, K.N. (1983). X - Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments (1757–1947). Cambridge University Press
Sunderland, David (2013). Financing the Raj: The City of London and Colonial India, 1858-1940. Boydell Press
Dewey, Clive (1978). Patwari and Chaukidar: Subordinate officials and the reliability of India’s agricultural statistics. Athlone Press
Smith, Lisa (2015). The great Indian calorie debate: Explaining rising undernourishment during India’s rapid economic growth. Food Policy
Duh, Josephine & Spears, Dean (2016). Health and Hunger: Disease, Energy Needs, and the Indian Calorie Consumption Puzzle. The Economic Journal
Vankatesh, P. et al. (2016). Relationship between Food Production and Consumption Diversity in India – Empirical Evidences from Cross Section Analysis. Agricultural Economics Research Review
Gupta, Shaibal (1980). Potential of Industrial Revolution in Pre-British India. Economic and Political Weekly
Raychaudhuri, Tapan (1983). I - The mid-eighteenth-century background. Cambridge University Press
Yasuba, Yasukichi (1986). Standard of Living in Japan Before Industrialization: From what Level did Japan Begin? A Comment. The Journal of Economic History
Tomblinson, B.R. (1985). Writing History Sideways: Lessons for Indian Economic Historians from Meiji Japan. Cambridge University Press
Rajan, M.S. (1969). The Impact of British Rule in India. Journal of Contemporary History
Bryant, G.J. (2000). Indigenous Mercenaries in the Service of European Imperialists: The Case of the Sepoys in the Early British Indian Army, 1750-1800. War in History
submitted by GaslightEveryone to u/GaslightEveryone [link] [comments]

Wayland Group DD

I want to use this thread to present the key findings of going through recent Wayland news releases. Everything shown here is public accessible. I have no intention to accuse someone of fraud or something like this, just asking questions ....

Feb 20 2019: Wayland Group Provides Corporate Update
I do not want to speak about the well below average generated revenues nor the revenue forecasts. Just as a side note: Ben had a forecast of ~ $15,000,000 for Q4 2018 (October – December 2018). The corporate update states $1,305,033 for Q4 2018 (< 10 percentage of the forecast). In addition, you cannot whitewash the 480% increase to the previous quarter.

“Wayland has also entered into an agreement to obtain additional funds to support the expansion of the Company’s global footprint and fund development of its flagship Langton facility. This agreement is with certain investment funds managed by Alpha Blue Ocean Inc. (“Alpha Blue”) a money manager based in London, United Kingdom with a strong track record of partnering with public companies and delivering meaningful value to their shareholders.”

Founder and CEO of Alpha Blue Ocean Inc. is Pierre Vannineuse (https://www.linkedin.com/in/piervan/)

Ok let’s have a look at their strong track record:

JUN 21 2018
QuickCool AB (Publ) ("QuickCool" or the "Company") has entered into a financing agreement with European High Growth Opportunities Securitization Fund through its financial advisor Alpha Blue Ocean Inc.
See: http://news.cision.com/quickcool/quickcool-ab-enters-into-a-financing-agreement-with-european-high-growth-opportunities-securitizatio,c2554476

See performance since financing: https://i.imgur.com/j7HxzPk.png

Okay next
MAR 28 2018: CybAero and European High Growth Opportunities Securitization Fund (“EHGO”), advised by Alpha Blue Ocean Advisors Ltd, member of the Alpha Blue Ocean Investment Group (“ABO”), has now signed an agreement regarding a financing solution of up to SEK 52.5 million in the form of thirteen convertible loans, the first loan of SEK 4.5 million and the following twelve loans each of SEK 4 million.
See: http://news.cision.com/cybaero/cybaero-signs-agreement-with-alpha-blue-ocean-for-up-to-sek-52-5-million,c2483046

Seriously? Just 3 months later:
June 22 2018: Sweden’s largest military drone maker files for bankruptcy
“CybAero had provisionally negotiated a financing solution with the Luxembourg-based European High Growth Opportunities Securitization Fund, or EHGO, to raise $6 million in the form of 13 convertible loans. The EHGO had hired the London-based Alpha Blue Ocean Advisors to mediate a deal. The first tranche in this solution involved a bridge loan amounting to $227,000.
Nasdaq First North rejected this first tranche arrangement and insisted that, in order for trading in its share to resume, CybAero needed to place a minimum of $114,000 in escrow on a authorized bank account. Moreover, Nasdaq First North launched an investigation to determine if the negotiated financing solution violated stock exchange rules.”
See: https://www.defensenews.com/newsletters/unmanned-systems/2018/06/22/swedens-largest-military-drone-maker-files-for-bankruptcy/

Also see: https://simplywall.st/stocks/se/capital-goods/sto-cba/cybaero-shares/news/will-you-be-burnt-by-cybaero-abs-stocba-cash-burn/

Okay next
Feb 20 2018: MOLOGEN AG enters into financing agreement with Alpha Blue Ocean's European High Growth Opportunities Securitization Fund
See: https://www.dgap.de/dgap/News/corporate/mologen-enters-into-financing-agreement-with-alpha-blue-oceans-european-high-growth-opportunities-securitization-fund/?newsID=1053753

See performance since financing: https://i.imgur.com/JXVJ7yq.png

Okay next
19 March 2018: Cereno Scientific enters into a financing agreement with European High Growth Opportunities Securitization Fund through its advisor Alpha Blue Ocean
See: https://www.cerenoscientific.se/en/en/ehgo_agreement

See performance since financing: https://i.imgur.com/CS7rq5y.png

Okay next
10 Jan 2018: FIT Biotech's EUR 10 million financing agreements' share loan and first part of commitment fee related shares have been handed over today to Alpha Blue Ocean
See: https://www.pm360online.com/fit-biotech-oy-fit-biotechs-eur-10-million-financing-agreements-share-loan-and-first-part-of-commitment-fee-related-shares-have-been-handed-over-today-to-alpha-blue-ocean/

See performance since financing: https://i.imgur.com/N0XhSQp.png

FIT Biotech Oy Company release 20.02.2019 at 14:30 EET
Liquidity crisis, request for a tranche and changes to financial calendar and date of the Annual General Meeting
Despite the financing agreement in force, Alpha Blue Ocean (”ABO”) has not paid tranches envisaged by the agreement since 12 November 2018. This has resulted in a liquidity crisis in FIT Biotech Oy (”Company”). The Company has today filed a latest request for a tranche with ABO. Unless ABO pays this tranche by 22 February 2019, Company will have to file for bankruptcy.
See: https://www.marketscreener.com/FIT-BIOTECH-OY-22752983/news/FIT-Biotech-Oy-Liquidity-crisis-request-for-a-tranche-and-changes-to-financial-calendar-and-date-o-28037452/

I think you are able to recognize the pattern. However the best is yet to come. Just google “alpha blue ocean death spiral”. Same type of financing for Element ASA – a Norwegian based mining company.

“The Induct Manager will demand a million dollar compensation from the "Death Spiral Mortgage Company" Alpha Blue Ocean Stock Exchange and Finance”
See: https://vaaju.com/norway/the-induct-manager-will-demand-a-million-dollar-compensation-from-the-death-spiral-mortgage-company-alpha-blue-ocean-stock-exchange-and-finance/

Why Would a Company Want Death Spiral Financing?
“A company that seeks death spiral financing basically has no other option to raise money to survive.”
See: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deathspiral.asp

See also:


Biotech Firms Run Away After Industry Party With Topless Dancers
See: https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/after-biotech-party-features-topless-dancers-firms-pull-support#gs.RO9Bf8oK

https://i.imgur.com/oQ4n3TC.png
Haha … Sean?

Also have a look after Pierre Vannineuse other investing company Bracknor IG. I did not check, but it possibly has a similar track record.

I could go on like this, but I think you got it. So this means “strong track record and delivering meaningful value to their shareholders.” for Ben?

Next news release:
Feb. 07, 2019: Wayland Group Receives EU-GMP Certification for German Facility
“Wayland Group is pleased to announce that it has received both Good Manufacturing Practices and Good Distribution Practices certifications from the national authority in the State of Saxony for the Company’s Ebersbach facility in Germany.”
See: https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/02/07/1711837/0/en/Wayland-Group-Receives-EU-GMP-Certification-for-German-Facility.html

Welcome to EudraGMDP
EudraGMDP is the name for the Union database referred to in article 111(6) of Directive 2001/83/EC and article 80(6) of Directive 2001/82/EC. It contains the following information:
· Manufacturing and import authorisations
· Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certificates.
· Statements of non-compliance with GMP
· GMP inspection planning in third countries
See: http://eudragmdp.ema.europa.eu/inspections/displayWelcome.do

https://i.imgur.com/W2zdxqH.png

Looks promising

https://i.imgur.com/c6yVRxu.png

SCOPE OF AUTHORISATION
Name and address of the site : Maricann GmbH, Moritzburger Weg 1, Ebersbach OT Naunhof, Sachsen, 01561, Germany
Human Medicinal Products
Authorised Operations
IMPORTATION OF MEDICINAL PRODUCTS (according to part 2)
Part 2 - IMPORTATION OF MEDICINAL PRODUCTS
2.3 Other importation activities
2.3.1 Site of physical importation
2.3.2 Importation of intermediate which undergoes further processing

But where is the GMP certificate? Latest GMP certificates for Germany:

https://i.imgur.com/bZxouN0.png
https://i.imgur.com/ZOlvlwo.png

Just for their facility in Canada. Maybe the missing of the announced GMP certificate is because of the german tender process. Maybe not, who knows …

“These certifications provide Wayland with the foundation to start selling product into the lucrative German and other developing European markets …”

Oh really? Not in my view …

Next news release:
Jan. 31, 2019: Wayland Group Comments on Recent Promotional Market Activity

“Since September 1, 2017 the Company has engaged MJM Markets and Consulting (Toronto, Canada; Follow The Money Investor Group, o/a 2632436 Ontario Limited (Toronto, Canada); Harbor Access LLC (NY, USA); Investing News Network; M. Davis & Associates Capital Inc (Vancouver, Canada); ERPR AS (Oslo, Norway); BlackX GmbH (Germany); Tycona Media (Vancouver, Canada); DiePRBerator (Germany); Global Financial Network (Toronto, Canada), and Prosdocimi (London, UK) at various times to provide investor relations services, public relations services, marketing, native advertising or other related services including the promotion of the Company, its business and/or its securities.”

See: https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/01/31/1708838/0/en/Wayland-Group-Comments-on-Recent-Promotional-Market-Activity.html

Really? What is your business model @ Wayland?!

Just to give you one example:

BlackX GmbH received 1,300,000 shares (each $1.50 = $1,950,000) for the creation/translation of pump articles. See: https://webfiles.thecse.com/CSE_Form_9_-_Notice_of_Issuance_of_Securities_BlackX_12Nov2018.pdf?4gdPoHHl03IN_5qafloB2.0FP4zHeqYb=

For what exactly? Example:
https://www.dgap.de/dgap/News/dgap_media/maricann-group-inc-mit-volldampf-die-zukunft-ceo-ben-ward-gibt-ausblick-ueber-hervorragende-entwicklung-der-wayland-group/?newsID=1110809

A template lacking in content with share price predictions of 3 to 5 Euro (4.5 – 7.5 CAD).

Next news release:
Jan 30 2019: Wayland Group Corporation: European Cannabis Giant Wayland is said to be in advanced talks to purchase and re-open the Voss Water bottling plant in Norway
See: https://www.ftmig.com/company-news-releases/european-cannabis-giant-wayland-is-said-to-be-in-advanced-talks-to-purchase-and-re-open-the-voss-water-bottling-plant-in-norway/

The not named London based Norwegian investor in the last paragraph is probably Lars Christian Beitnes (also mentioned in the second paragraph). After reading his name in a Wayland press release again, I got excited. Again? Yes, I have done some DD about Beitnes when Wayland announced the first Malta LOI with Medican Holdings (USD$10.1MM for a recently created shell company in Malta) - see: https://www.newcannabisventures.com/maricann-to-pay-10-million-to-acquire-malta-licensed-cannabis-producer-medican-holdings/

I was glad when Malta Enterprise terminated this LOI “Malta Enterprise then contacted Maricann to request the Company make its own application, as their preference was to work through Maricann rather than Medican.“ – see: https://www.newcannabisventures.com/maricann-to-pursue-malta-medical-cannabis-license-independently/

Why am I shocked to see the name Beitnes and Wayland in a press release?
In my view Beitnes is far away from being a person you should do deals with. He is being accused to be part of several frauds/scams in the past/present and recently left as a Chairmen of Element ASA – see: https://www.dn.no/bors/element/lars-christian-beitnes/rikard-storvestre/avtroppende-styreleder-far-100000-kroner-i-maneden-for-radgivning/2-1-498862

Element ASA … wait … yea the norwegian based mining company who is the victim of the death spiral financing by Alpha Blue Ocean Inc.!!!

There is a long thread about him in a Norwegian stock community with everything mentioned why you should avoid him – see: https://forum.hegnar.no/thread/16282/view/0/0?page=1

Because of the length of the thread, see some highlights:

I know this is much content, but if you want to make your own picture of Beitnes just dig into this whole Element ASA debacle starting last year. Two auditors (EY & PwC) and the CFO left Element … Then Beitnes left as Chairmen but now serving as external consultant for Element receiving 100.000 NOK monthly. https://www.dn.no/bors/element/lars-christian-beitnes/rikard-storvestre/avtroppende-styreleder-far-100000-kroner-i-maneden-for-radgivning/2-1-498862 would be a good start. Or dig deeper into the Swedish Pensions Authority lawsuit against Beitnes.

Finally … just ask yourself why does Ben deals with such shady persons? Did Ben no DD on those guys or did he not want to … And that is just the top of the iceberg.


TO BE CONTINUED
submitted by PHan222 to weedstocks [link] [comments]

Year End/Year Beginning Ruminations (Contributions wanted and welcome from everyone)

Hi all, I wanted to post some ruminations on trading that hit me this year. Most of this is common sense, but sometimes it helps to put it to words or to see others who are going through it.
TIMES OF STRESS
So, this is not a pity party for Huachi, instead it is a hard but good lesson learned that I need to pass on;. I like this sub, I'm an experienced trader (FX and stock) with a decent background in options and Futures, and was trying to be actively involved in TheWallStreet as well as growing my trading capital and my retirement accounts. Back in September, I had a family emergency that was medical in nature. This required my total attention, with emergency time off from work, where I had to care for that family member medically (I'm in the medical field, I do this for a living, and it still was a massive undertaking), as well as dealing with the fallout of that person's life choices. This is soft language for I love this person but their life can be a trainwreck that I had clean up. This meant 100% mental energy 100% of the time for 2 months solid, burning FMLA the whole time. I was not in the mind to do anything else, but unfortunately right after hitting the ground, I took an open position that turned out to be a bad idea - I was short /LE and /ZS in the form of long puts, and took that position just prior to a hurricane scare (which spiked Soybeans) as well as a bull market (no pun... well maybe not) for cattle. I held till death, no stop loss, no reflection, no GTFO we are in trouble. This cost me a good 8K in trading capital that I sorely needed and still need today.
When you are massively stressed, your worst trading habits, whatever they are, will come out in spades. Gambler? You are going to be hitting the craps table with your account. Revenge trader? You'll hold till you die on something that you would have bailed on during normal times. Poor sizer? Risking 100% with no stop loss is the par.... you get the drift. Your worst habits will come out in droves. I'm a seasoned trader and investor, but I have horrible impulse control that I have had to overcome with years of work to be successful in doing this. Self analyze, and realize that the same battle you fight everyday doing this wonderful trading business is going to be amplified exponentially in a stressor.
My advice to most of you (not all, because some would be able to focus, but most won't) is to exit all positions when a true, bad ass emergency happens. I don't care how confident you are in them, if you cannot treat this trading as a second career and keep those positions under your hawk's eye, and start to back burner it, it is going to burn you. Exit all positions immediately, even at a loss, come back with a clear head when the situation has resolved. Family emergency, girl/boy emergency, your children emergency, work emergency, whatever, being open during this can kill you. I wish I had that 8K back, but I don't. Between that loss and then the output of almost 20K of my own cash money just to pay bills, I have a tiny trading account now!!
EDIT: This wasn't rent money.
CAREER
Which brings me to this. I don't see it as much here as I do on other subs (especially Forex and WSB), but there are enough new traders that I see trying to trade gamble their way out of a dead end job or unhappy career. Many of the traders here, especially the ones wielding big gains, already have established, well paying careers in professional fields. I am one of them. Your earnings flow from your sweat equity. I spent years in a dead end, high hours, low pay and low reward job trying to wagegamble/trade my way out of a life that was unhappy. Now, that gave me a solid experience base, but trying to flip $300 in Forex money into spendable cash was just not going to happen, at least for me.... and this is true for most traders. You want a career that is intellectually and fiscally rewarding and that leaves you with some free time. I recognize that this is Dad advice, but your trading will prosper once you have a good career that produces healthy revenue that you can trade. As well, when faced with the aforementioned emergency, you can re-capitalize in a relatively short time and get back to work. I estimate I should be OK by March/April for funds... but I don't want to tempt the Gods.
ROTH IRA
Total right turn here, but do you have a Roth IRA? I am a believer in this vehicle. The benefit of a Roth is that whatever gains you make you keep. You pay no taxes as what goes into the Roth is after tax money. This means you can amplify your earnings. Your Roth maximum contribution is capped at $5500 per year for 2018, but as you grow that, you owe no taxes. Roth is a retirement account accessible at 59 1/2 years, and also can serve as an emergency fund because it has some accessibility as one. In short, get a Roth! You aren't being eaten by quarterly taxes, and you can grow yours wonderfully.
Good luck everybody. Ruminations, advice, comments, and snide remarks are welcome below.
submitted by El_Huachinango to thewallstreet [link] [comments]

Hedging - Good, Bad, the Dirty

Communication is all about clarity. We communicate some piece of information, the recipient gets it. Straightforward on the face of it. Speaking about trading will typically be succinct, focused, and very clear when complete.
The ‘audience’ has as many expectations as the speaker though: one should know the context and purpose of the information they are getting to a specific discourse.
I occasionally drop into jargon or analogy. It’s a personal weakness: I assume the audience will have the appropriate context of the situation, and knowledge of the context. It’s also a habit. I was on a recorded line for a decade, and use as few a words as possible in a business situation.
My writing, not so much.
I’ve hesitated to talk much about trading, because of ‘it’. I’ve seen ‘it’ far too often…..’it’ being people using language and jargon of trading without really knowing what they are talking about.
A great example of this is around options. People can pick up the definitions, the verbiage, the ‘lingua franca’ as it were.
Problem is, they have no clue what they are talking about in the whole.
Sure, definitions are known and expounded upon. But the context/situation remains in the abstract to them. Or what they are talking about doesn’t sync with the nature and purpose of the exposure they are taking on. Like talking about that cool new skateboard you’re riding as you're sitting on a bicycle.
This isn’t conceit or hubris - it’s only what I’ve observed. Hence the backstory above.
Speaking with u/modo85 and u/TheJosh last week plugged me in again to professionals face to face, and a recent post about Constellation by a sub got me thinking about trade again. So….I’m going to tackle the most misunderstood word in trade: hedging.
I was taught in business school that a hedge is a ‘risk neutral activity’.
One can find definitions for hedging in many places, and for the most part, they’ll align. What won’t is the people using the term.
Dynegy, Enron, and other companies took on ‘hedging programs’ that were often positions of leverage. Even the word ‘hedge fund’ is a relative misnomer. Looking at some of the bomb craters left behind by a couple of them....they were either simply a ponzi or flavours of insider trading. They weren’t hedging, they were stealing.
So, what’s a hedge?
A risk neutral activity that reduces aggregate risk to a primary exposure.
A Canadian company buying a greenhouse from an American supplier in 4 easy payments over the next 2 years? Great. You’ll have to pay in USD, so, buy forwards in 6 month increments, pay CAD at the time they come due, your forex exposure is gone, and the total cost is known in advance.
The USD/CAD rate might move for or against you during that time.
But that’s the point of a hedge: replace risk with certainty.
A while ago, Westjet bought a strip of jet fuel futures, taking out physical price exposure for (a very long) 2 years. While not unheard of, it’s a pretty big move. If jet fuel prices tank, they get to eat the difference. As it happened, jet fuel prices soared, Westjet bought physical with cash and offset the futures gains against it. They enjoyed a 2 year window of serious operational cost advantage, and their share price accretion showed it.
Prescient....or lucky? That’s what business books are written about.
This example might have prompted you to think about another industry where energy is the single largest direct input cost behind headcount (hint: it's cannabis)
Constellation’s entry through the CGC buy is another example of a hedge to myself. Different nature and purpose, but a hedge nonetheless.
In my eyes, STZ sells booze. Weed will impact aggregate sales of booze, with potential to reduce it.
STZ’s buy into the industry is a hedge is to replace dislodged revenue from booze by dope: cannabis exposure will replace these lost revenues, keeping STZ whole.
A hedging program is part of a larger initiative, and plugged directly into the strategic course of the business. It has topline impact.
If you’ve noticed - the Westjet and STZ examples above are for far different underlying purposes - but they are both simply hedges.
Hedging for the retail investor might entail seeking exposure to different provinces, or different links of the value chain, or perhaps within wholesale or retail price exposures.
With hedging, you are seeking to reduce, not enhance, existing exposure.
The other takeaway is (and there is one in here): don’t use terminology and trade terms unless you know exactly what you are talking about, or what the underlying purpose of using it is. It doesn’t matter what someone notices or thinks: any professional can tell pretty quickly if someone knows what they are talking about.
What really matters is that you know what you are actually doing when you take on risk of loss to your capital.
submitted by mollytime to TheCannalysts [link] [comments]

The intelligent investors guide to cryptocurrency: Part 3b - Pricing and liquidity

*Introductions: I'm joskye. A cryptocurrency investor and holder. *
...
 
Hi again. This is the third part in our ongoing series on how to trade better and determine intelligent investments in cryptocurrency for the future.
 
 
Part 3b continues where I left off with a discussion about price metrics specifically, what determines the price and the importance of liquidity:
...
 
The day traders:
 
As I mentioned in my previous article, as of writing almost every cryptocurrency is determined purely by speculative value.
 
 
For instance in cryptocurrency Bitcoin is still the biggest player in the game. It carries a per unit price of $900 per coin. There are currently 16,090,137 (16 million) coins in circulation giving it a total marketcap value of [$900 x 16090137 =] $14481123300 or 14.48 billion USD.
 
 
Shadowcash looks even more meagre compared to the total cryptocurrency marketcap with only 0.048% of the total cryptocurrency sphere.
To any Shadowcash holders despairing at this point, relax. There are over 707 cryptocurrencies trading as of writing and SDC holds the 27th ranking in terms of market cap. In such a competitive field, filled with scams that's pretty good. Moreso when you consider that SDC is a legitimate technology and is currently probably very undervalued.
...
 
Lets look at the rich list for bitcoin:
 
Why did I just talk about this?
 
In cryptocurrency I see this happening on the markets all the time. Indeed market manipulation effects every single cryptocurrency eventually.
...
 
Market manipulation!
 
Large holders of valuable, high marketcap coins will often make multiple small volume purchases of less valuable, low marketcap coins. Often this will follow announcements regarding developments in that low marketcap coin.
 
 
Low volume buying in a market with low daily trading volume can gradually drive up the price attracting an influx of buyers into that coin; often they will make larger volume purchases of it which helps drive up the price much further. This will trigger a further chain of buyers experiencing FOMO (fear of missing out, detailed in Part 2) who will drive up the price even further. The price will pump. Often will smaller cap cryptocurrencies this may result in a sudden 20, 40, 60 or even +100% increase in value often over a very short time space (1-2 days, 1-2 weeks maximum).
 
 
The only way to discern if the sudden rise in coin value is due to pre-rigged market manipulation is to look at:
 
You are looking for organic, gradual growth based on a solid value proposition. Sudden large spikes in value should make you pause and wonder if it's worth waiting for a gradual correction (organic drop) in price before entering your buy order.
 
Do not fall for a pump and dump. Stick to the lessons covered in previous parts of this guide (especially part 3a and 2) and you will be much less likely to lose money in the long run trading and investing in cryptocurrencies.
...
 
The pattern of change on daily trading volume, the order book and liquidity:
 
Lets look at SDC and Bitcoin again. This time we are going to compare the daily trading volume (last 24 hours) in USD.
 
 
I'd just like to use this opportunity to point out and reinforce the idea that day traders not holders dictate the daily price of an asset. I'd also like to point out daily global trading volume on Forex is $4800 billion which makes Bitcoin a very small fish in the broader arena of global finance and trade i.e. Bitcoin is still very vulnerable to all the price manipulation tactics and liquidity issues I am going to be describing in this article by bigger players with richer pockets.
 
 
The daily trading volume also gives you an idea of how much fiat currency you can invest into a given cryptocurrency before you suddenly shift the price.
 
 
A sudden rise in coin price heavily out of proportion to the rise in daily trading volume should be the first sign to alert you to a pump & dump scam.
 
Daily trading volume should show a steady increase over time with sustained buy support at new price levels; this is a good marker of organic, sustainable growth.
...
 
For more detail you can now look at the depth chart:
 
The depth chart is very useful to know how much fiat currency is required to cause the spot price of a given cryptocurrency to rise or fall by a given amount.
 
NB the price of most cryptocurrencies is expressed in Bitcoin because it has the largest market cap and daily trading volume of all cryptocurrencies by a very large margin and because with a few exceptions (Ethereum, Monero) most cryptocurrencies do not have routes to directly purchase via fiat currency without first purchasing Bitcoin.
 
Liquidity is super important. People often complain about a market lacking liquidity but that is often because they are trading in fiat volumes which far exceed the daily trading fiat volumes of the cryptocurrency they are referring to. If you are investing or trading in a cryptocurrency, always factor in the your personal liquidity and need for liquidity relative to that of the cryptocurrency you are investing in. In other words don't expect to make a profit next day selling 'cryptocurrency x' if the size your single buy order composes >90% of the buy orders on the market for 'cryptocurrency x' that day (indeed in such a scenario be very prepared to sell at a loss next day if you absolutely have to)!
 
 
There are certain patterns on a depth chart that make me believe a significant, sustained price rise is imminent: One example occurs when there is a very large volume of buy orders (>25% of total buy volume within 5% of current price) very close to the current (spot) price, and a very large number of sell orders close to but significantly above the spot price (approx 25% total sell volume within 10% of current price) and especially if the total buy order volume is a significantly higher percentage than it has previously been. This simply indicates high demand at current price which may soon outstrip supply. Again I stress that these patterns can be manipulated easily by wealthy traders.
 
...
 
The order book is another way of looking at the depth chart and allows you to see the specific transactions occurring that compose daily trading volume by the second!
 
I find it useful because it allows me to identify:
 
...
 
The price charts:
 
Discussions about price charts could be endless. I'm not going to go into too much detail, mostly because I'm an investor who believes the value proposition, good consistent development, decent marketing and communications will ultimately trump spot prices and adverse (or positive) short term price trends in the future.
...
 
The news cycle:
 
...
 
Other interesting points: The 'coin x' scenario and the ridiculousness of marketcap:
 
'Coin X' is an imaginary hypothetical coin. There are only 10 in circulation. It has no value proposition beyond it's speculative value i.e. it will never generate a revenue independent of it's speculative value.
 
 
I'd like to point out the similarities between ZCash and 'coin x' (especially during it's launch).
...
 
Lessons:
 
 
...
 
References:
1. Coinmarketcap rankings: https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/ 2. Coinmarketcap daily trading volumes https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/volume/24-hou 3. Bitinfocharts - Top 100 Richest Bitcoin addresses: https://bitinfocharts.com/top-100-richest-bitcoin-addresses.html 4. Crypto ID - Shadowcash Rich list: https://chainz.cryptoid.info/sdc/#!rich 
 
...
 
Further articles in this series:
 
"The intelligent investors guide to cryptocurrency"
 
Part 0 -
Part 1 -
Part 2 -
Part 3a -
Part 3b -
Part 4 -
Part 5 -
Part 6 -
Part 7a -
 
"The intelligent investors guide to Particl -"
 
 
Full disclosure/Disclaimer: At time of original writing I had long positions in Ethereum (ETH), Shadowcash (SDC), Iconomi (ICN), Augur (REP) and Digix (DGD). All the opinions expressed are my own. I cannot guarantee gains; losses are sustainable; do your own financial research and make your decisions responsibly. All prices and values given are as of time of first writing (Midday 8th-Jan-2017).
 
Second disclaimer: Please do not buy Shadowcash (SDC), the project has been abandoned by it's developers who have moved on to the Particl Project (PART). The PARTICL crowd fund and SDC 1:1 token swap completed April 15th. You can still exchange SDC for PART but only if it was acquired prior to 15th April 2017 see: https://particl.news/a-community-driven-initiative-e26724100c3a for more information.
 
Addendum: Article updated 23-11-2017 to edit references to SDC (changed to Particl where relevant to reflect updated status) and clean up formatting.
submitted by joskye to Particl [link] [comments]

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